TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2007//
TI  - An‐arrgh‐chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization
JO  - Journal of political economy
A1  - Leeson, Peter T.
SP  - 1049
EP  - 1094
VL  - 115
IS  - 6
N2  - This article investigates the internal governance institutions of violent criminal enterprise by examining the law, economics, and organization of pirates. To effectively organize their banditry, pirates required mechanisms to prevent internal predation, minimize crew conflict, and maximize piratical profit. Pirates devised two institutions for this purpose. First, I analyze the system of piratical checks and balances crews used to constrain captain predation. Second, I examine how pirates used democratic constitutions to minimize conflict and create piratical law and order. Pirate governance created sufficient order and cooperation to make pirates one of the most sophisticated and successful criminal organizations in history.<p /> 
LA  - 
SN  - 0022-3808
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/526403
ID  - ref1
ER  -