TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2005//
TI  - The hazards of thinking about moral hazard
JO  - Ethnopolitics
A1  - Wagner, Harrison R.
SP  - 237
EP  - 246
VL  - 4
IS  - 2
N2  - Some scholars have argued that expectations of humanitarian military intervention might actually increase the incidence of intrastate violence, and have invoked the concept of moral hazard from the economics literature on insurance and government regulation to explain why. However, the term ‘moral hazard’ is no substitute for a careful analysis of how expectations of intervention might influence the decisions made by participants in intrastate conflicts. I argue that an analysis of those decisions implies that the prospect of intervention might indeed make violence more likely, but for reasons that have little to do with what is commonly called moral hazard.<p /> 
LA  - 
SN  - 1744-9057
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449050500147283
ID  - ref1
ER  -