TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2009//
TI  - Deterrence: Credibility and Proportionality
JO  - Economics and politics
A1  - Arce, Daniel
A1  - Sandler, Todd
SP  - 384
EP  - 408
VL  - 21
IS  - 3
N2  - This paper extends the analysis of deterrence to examine terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and rogue nations. Such situations are characterized by differential pre-emptive and response capacity, in contrast to the traditional deterrence literature on nuclear superpowers, where such factors are absent. We focus on the credibility of deterrence responses to pre-emption and show that credible (subgame-perfect) responses are rarely proportional. The analysis is also extended to asymmetric deterrence scenarios whereby credibility and proportionality depend on the potential aggressor's access to conflict technology and the responder's preferences for indirect conflict vs. the status quo.<p /> 
LA  - 
SN  - 0954-1985
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00352.x
ID  - ref1
ER  -