TY - JOUR PY - 2011// TI - Emotion, Neuroscience, and Law: A Comment on Darwin and Greene JO - Emotion review A1 - Mikhail, John SP - 293 EP - 295 VL - 3 IS - 3 N2 - Darwin's (1871/1981) observation that evolution has produced in us certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct that lack any obvious basis in individual utility is a useful springboard from which to clarify the role of emotion in moral judgment. The problem is whether a certain class of moral judgment is "constituted" or "driven by" emotion (Greene, 2008, p. 108) or merely correlated with emotion while being generated by unconscious computations (e.g., Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2008). With one exception, all of the "personal" vignettes devised by Greene and colleagues (2001, 2004) and subsequently used by other researchers (e.g., Koenigs et al., 2007), in their fMRI and behavioral studies of emotional engagement in moral judgment, involve violent crimes or torts. These studies thus do much more than highlight the role of emotion in moral judgment; they also support the classical rationalist thesis that moral rules are engraved in the mind.

LA - SN - 1754-0739 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1754073911406150 ID - ref1 ER -