TY - JOUR PY - 2011// TI - Terrorism and Cabinet Duration JO - International economic review A1 - Gassebner, Martin A1 - Jong‐A‐Pin, Richard A1 - Mierau, Jochen O. SP - 1253 EP - 1270 VL - 52 IS - 4 N2 - Terrorism can strengthen or weaken electoral support for ruling governments. We show in a simple model of coalition formation that, regardless of the direction of a public opinion shock, the impact of terrorism on cabinet duration is ambiguous. However, in an analysis of a data set including 2,400 cabinets in over 150 countries in the period 1970-2002, we find that terrorism, on average, shortens cabinet duration. This result is robust for a range of alternative terror measures and is present in both democratic as well as autocratic political regimes.
LA - SN - 0020-6598 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00666.x ID - ref1 ER -