TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2007//
TI  - The Becker Paradox and Type I Versus Type Ii Errors in the Economics of Crime
JO  - International economic review
A1  - Persson, Mats
A1  - Siven, Claes‐Henric
SP  - 211
EP  - 233
VL  - 48
IS  - 1
N2  - Two real-world observations are not easily replicated in models of crime. First, although capital punishment is optimal in the standard Becker model, it is rarely observed in the real world. Second, criminal procedure and the evaluation of evidence vary across societies and historical periods, the standard of proof being sometimes very high and sometimes quite low. In this article, we develop a general equilibrium model of judicial procedure allowing for innocent persons being convicted. We show that the median voter theorem applies to this model, making judicial procedure endogenous. So formulated, the model can replicate both empirical observations.<p /> 
LA  - 
SN  - 0020-6598
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00423.x
ID  - ref1
ER  -