TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2000//
TI  - Product liability, entry incentives and market structure
JO  - International review of law and economics
A1  - Hamilton, Stephen F.
A1  - Sunding, David L.
SP  - 269
EP  - 283
VL  - 20
IS  - 2
N2  - The article characterizes the entry incentives provided by increases in product liability under various forms of competition. It is demonstrated that the entry of small, high-cost firms is likely to occur in imperfectly competitive markets when the average damage increases with industry output. Special cases are considered, including Cournot-Nash oligopoly and dominant firm-competitive fringe.<p /> 
LA  - 
SN  - 0144-8188
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00029-6
ID  - ref1
ER  -