TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2011//
TI  - Semi-collusion in media markets
JO  - International review of law and economics
A1  - Dewenter, Ralf
A1  - Haucap, Justus
A1  - Wenzel, Tobias
SP  - 92
EP  - 98
VL  - 31
IS  - 2
N2  - This paper explores the effects that collusion can have in newspaper markets where firms compete for advertising as well as for readership. We compare three modes of competition: (i) competition in the advertising and the reader market, (ii) semi-collusion over advertising (with competition in the reader market), and (iii) (full) collusion in both the advertising and the reader market. We find that semi-collusion leads to less advertising (but higher advertising prices) and lower copy prices which is beneficial for readers. Under certain circumstances, semi-collusion may even benefit advertisers as newspaper circulation is higher. In addition, total welfare may rise due to semi-collusion. Results under full collusion are ambiguous. However, even under full collusion newspaper copy prices may decrease and welfare may increase.<p /> 
LA  - 
SN  - 0144-8188
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2011.02.001
ID  - ref1
ER  -