TY - JOUR PY - 2011// TI - Is your profiling strategy robust? JO - Law, probability and risk A1 - Davidovitch, Lior A1 - Ben-Haim, Yakov SP - 59 EP - 76 VL - 10 IS - 1 N2 - The economic theory of crime views criminals as rational decision makers, implying elastic response to law enforcement. Group-dependent elasticities can be exploited for efficient allocation of enforcement resources. However, profiling can augment both number of arrests and total crime since non-profiled groups will increase their criminality. Elasticities are highly uncertain, so prediction is difficult and uncertainty must be accounted for in designing a profiling strategy. We use info-gap theory for satisficing (not minimizing) total crime rate. Using an empirical example, based on running red lights, we demonstrate the trade-off between robustness to uncertainty and total crime rate.
Language: en
LA - en SN - 1470-8396 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/lpr/mgq012 ID - ref1 ER -