TY - JOUR PY - 2012// TI - Weakest-link attacker-defender games with multiple attack technologies JO - Naval research logistics A1 - Arce, Daniel G. A1 - Kovenock, Dan A1 - Roberson, Brian SP - 457 EP - 469 VL - 59 IS - 6 N2 - In this article, we examine a model of terrorism that focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has two qualitatively different attack modes at its disposal. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize an efficient but discrete attack technology - e.g., suicide attacks - when a more conventional mode of attack is available, and the optimal anti-terrorism measures. © Copyright 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

LA - en SN - 0894-069X UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/nav.21500 ID - ref1 ER -