TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2013//
TI  - A game theoretical model for location of terror response facilities under capacitated resources
JO  - ScientificWorldJournal
A1  - Meng, Lingpeng
A1  - Kang, Qi
A1  - Han, Chuanfeng
A1  - Xu, Weisheng
A1  - Wu, Qidi
SP  - 742845
EP  - 742845
VL  - 2013
IS  - 
N2  - This paper is concerned with the effect of capacity constraints on the locations of terror response facilities. We assume that the state has limited resources, and multiple facilities may be involved in the response until the demand is satisfied consequently. We formulate a leader-follower game model between the state and the terrorist and prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. An integer linear programming is proposed to obtain the equilibrium results when the facility number is fixed. The problem is demonstrated by a case study of the 19 districts of Shanghai, China.<p />  <p>Language: en</p>
LA  - en
SN  - 2356-6140
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/742845
ID  - ref1
ER  -