TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2014//
TI  - The Myth of Harmless Wrongs in Moral Cognition: Automatic Dyadic Completion From Sin to Suffering
JO  - Journal of experimental psychology: general
A1  - Gray, Kurt
A1  - Schein, Chelsea
A1  - Ward, Adrian F.
SP  - 1600
EP  - 1615
VL  - 143
IS  - 4
N2  - When something is wrong, someone is harmed. This hypothesis derives from the theory of dyadic morality, which suggests a moral cognitive template of wrongdoing agent and suffering patient (i.e., victim). This dyadic template means that victimless wrongs (e.g., masturbation) are psychologically incomplete, compelling the mind to perceive victims even when they are objectively absent. Five studies reveal that dyadic completion occurs automatically and implicitly: Ostensibly harmless wrongs are perceived to have victims (Study 1), activate concepts of harm (Studies 2 and 3), and increase perceptions of suffering (Studies 4 and 5). These results suggest that perceiving harm in immorality is intuitive and does not require effortful rationalization. This interpretation argues against both standard interpretations of moral dumbfounding and domain-specific theories of morality that assume the psychological existence of harmless wrongs. Dyadic completion also suggests that moral dilemmas in which wrongness (deontology) and harm (utilitarianism) conflict are unrepresentative of typical moral cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).<p /> <p>Language: en</p>
LA  - en
SN  - 0096-3445
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0036149
ID  - ref1
ER  -