TY  - JOUR
PY  - 1979//
TI  - The Economics of Jailing Executives for Violations of Health and Safety Regulations
JO  - Journal of consumer affairs
A1  - Beilock, Richard P.
SP  - 386
EP  - 392
VL  - 13
IS  - 2
N2  - Richard Nielsen [ref below] dealt with the issue of whether executives should be held criminally liable for health-safety regulation violations. His paper reviewed judicial decisions in this country and offered views, both pro and con. The article deserves much credit for pointing out a serious issue; however, it did not provide a framework for analysis of the problem. It is to this task that this note is addressed.    The analysis will attempt to answer three questions. First, are health-safety regulations necessary? Or, alternatively stated, could not an unregulated market arrive at socially optimal standards of safety? Second, are executives in uniquely influential positions to affect safety levels? Third, if the answer to the second question is in the affirmative, are criminal penalties the socially optimal devices to enforce safety regulations? As a starting point, we will begin with an example of a situation where the unregulated market can lead to socially optimal levels of safety. We will then examine the implications of relaxing the assumptions that were necessary to achieve the optimal solution with a view toward answering our three questions.    Nielsen, Richard P. "Should Executives Be Jailed for Consumer and Employee Health and Safety Violations?" Journal of Consumer Affairs 1979; 13(1): 128-134.<p />
LA  - 
SN  - 0022-0078
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6606.1979.tb00154.x
ID  - ref1
ER  -