TY - JOUR PY - 2006// TI - Speeding, Terrorism, and Teaching to the Test JO - Quarterly journal of economics A1 - Lazear, Edward P. SP - 1029 EP - 1061 VL - 121 IS - 3 N2 - Educators worry that high-stakes testing will induce teachers and their students to focus only on the test and ignore other, untested aspects of knowledge. Some counter that although this may be true, knowing something is better than knowing nothing and many students would benefit even by learning the material that is to be tested. Using the metaphor of deterring drivers from speeding, it is shown that the optimal rules for high-stakes testing depend on the costs of learning and of monitoring. Incentives need to be concentrated for those whose costs of action are high.
LA - SN - 0033-5533 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/qjec.121.3.1029 ID - ref1 ER -