TY - JOUR
PY - 2018//
TI - African communal basis for autonomy and life choices
JO - Developing world bioethics
A1 - Ikuenobe, Polycarp
SP - 212
EP - 221
VL - 18
IS - 3
N2 - I argue that the metaphysical capacity of autonomy is not intrinsically valuable; it is valuable only when used in relation to a community's values and instrumentally for making the proper choices that will promote one's own and the community's well-being. I use the example of the choice to take one's life by suicide to illuminate this view. I articulate a plausible African conception of personhood as a basis for the idea of relational autonomy. I argue that this conception is better understood as a social-moral thesis, and not a metaphysical thesis. A metaphysical thesis gives an account of the abstract nature of an atomic individual, his agency, and rational choice. The social-moral thesis indicates that personhood and autonomy are positive and relational to the life plans, well-being, material conditions, and the best means for achieving them that are made available and possible by harmonious living in a community. This idea of autonomy is not just having the capacity of freewill; it also involves how such freewill is used, in terms of how an individual's choices are guided by internalized communal values.
© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Language: en
LA - en SN - 1471-8731 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/dewb.12161 ID - ref1 ER -