Incidents involving chemical weapons are on the rise. In the past week, reports from Syria allege that scores of people in the city of Douma were killed with a toxic gas, possibly chlorine, a tactic that experts say has been used in Syria at least a dozen times since 2012. Last month in Salisbury, UK, former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal, his daughter Yulia and a police officer were exposed to an organophosphate called novichok, one of a family of nerve agents said to be the deadliest known1. And Kim Jong-nam, the eldest son of former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, was assassinated in 2017 through exposure to another nerve agent, VX, at Kuala Lumpur international airport in Malaysia. These recent events risk reversing two decades of progress in disarmament. The intention of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)2, finalized in 1992, was to free the world of this weaponry. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which has implemented the convention since 1997, aimed to destroy all declared stockpiles of chemical weapons within a decade. That hasn’t happened, but it is still within reach. Today, 96% of known stockpiles have gone. It is crucial that, in uncertain times, nations do not fall back on using chemical weapons. In the past few years, political positions and structures that served people well for decades have been questioned. Insecure countries might become more willing to apply chemical weapons to harm opponents and secure strategic advantages. Meanwhile, the OPCW has lost some of its bite. Although investigators have been allowed in, Syria’s breaches have gone unpunished. And neither the United Kingdom nor Malaysia called in experts from the organization right away to deal with their recent nerve-agent attacks, even though immediate assistance is available under the convention. A new mindset is needed. It is impossible to ban every chemical that could be used to make a weapon, because almost all of them have other applications. For example, chlorine ...
Language: en
LA - en SN - 0028-0836 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/d41586-018-04579-2 ID - ref1 ER -