TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2018//
TI  - Measurement, ontology, and epistemology: psychology needs pragmatism-realism
JO  - Theory and psychology
A1  - Guyon, Hervé
A1  - Kop, Jean-Luc
A1  - Juhel, Jacques
A1  - Falissard, Bruno
SP  - 149
EP  - 171
VL  - 28
IS  - 2
N2  - Measurement in psychology is at the heart of a major debate in the academic literature. We aim to contribute to a critical discussion of this issue. We propose to reposition the object of this type of measure, namely a mental attribute as measured by mental tests. Mental attributes should be considered not as a true object independent of the knower, but as an emergent property of a person dependent on the social context. On the basis of this clarified ontology, we consider that an empirical approach to measuring a mental attribute is possible. This approach must be resolutely pragmatist and realist. In practical terms, this means that a test needs to be renegotiated relative to the context. The validation of quantitative measures requires verification of a certain number of criteria. Consequently, our work critically explores measures as they are usually implemented in the area of psychometrics.<p />  <p>Language: en</p>
LA  - en
SN  - 0959-3543
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354318761606
ID  - ref1
ER  -