TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2018//
TI  - The design and price of information
JO  - American economic review
A1  - Bergemann, Dirk
A1  - Bonatti, Alessandro
A1  - Smolin, Alex
SP  - 1
EP  - 48
VL  - 108
IS  - 1
N2  - A data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty. He can augment his initial private information with supplemental data from a data seller. His willingness to pay for supplemental data is determined by the quality of his initial private information. The data seller optimally offers a menu of statistical experiments. We establish the properties that any revenue-maximizing menu of experiments must satisfy. Every experiment is a non-dispersed stochastic matrix, and every menu contains a fully informative experiment. In the cases of binary states and actions, or binary types, we provide an explicit construction of the optimal menu of experiments.<p />  <p>Language: en</p>
LA  - en
SN  - 0002-8282
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20161079
ID  - ref1
ER  -