TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2018//
TI  - The role of visibility on third party punishment actions for the enforcement of social norms
JO  - Economics letters
A1  - Kamei, Kenju
SP  - 193
EP  - 197
VL  - 171
IS  - 
N2  - This paper presents results from a prisoner's dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. Third party punishment was frequently observed, in line with previous studies. Despite the prevalence of punishment, having one third party punisher in a group did not make one's defection materially unbeneficial because of the weak punishment intensity observed. When a third party player's action choice was made known to another third party player in a different group, however, third party punishment was sufficiently strong to transform the dilemma's incentive structure into a coordination game, through which cooperation norms can be effectively enforced.<p />  <p>Language: en</p>
LA  - en
SN  - 0165-1765
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.043
ID  - ref1
ER  -