TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2022//
TI  - Why incumbents perpetrate election violence during civil war
JO  - Conflict management and peace science
A1  - Flores, Thomas Edward
A1  - Nooruddin, Irfan
SP  - ePub
EP  - ePub
VL  - ePub
IS  - ePub
N2  - Civil conflict increases incumbents' vulnerability, expands their coercive capacity, enervates public good provision, and stifles public opposition. Consequently, we expect that elections held during civil conflict will feature more incumbent-perpetrated election violence. We test our argument with disaggregated data on election violence, generating two principal findings. First, elections held during civil conflict are more likely to feature violent coercion by incumbents. Second, this effect does not depend on the conflict's intensity or political salience, but is endemic to conflict-affected societies as a class. This raises questions about the nature of elections in conflict-affected societies and the relationship between forms of political violence.<p />  <p>Language: en</p>
LA  - en
SN  - 0738-8942
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/07388942221120382
ID  - ref1
ER  -