There are several, often mentioned, strategic and tactical advantages related to naval forces which occur as a result of their inherent characteristics. Because they possess both mobility and a light footprint, naval forces have the ability to be simultaneously present in a given place while being minimally intrusive, a feat no other service branch can accomplish: “[t]he fact that naval forces can ´loiter´ and be minimally intrusive is an important and unique contribution to deterrence. The Army can loiter, but it cannot be minimally intrusive; the Air Force can be minimally intrusive but it cannot loiter. Only naval forces can do both simultaneously” (UK Maritime Power 2017, 37). Moreover, with the sea as the area of operations naval forces are an essential instrument for the state not only in war, but in peacetime as well. In comparison to the army and air force, naval forces are useful to the state outside a war context as they provide prosperity to the state through the protection of shipping lanes and civilian vessels. Given these inherent and unique characteristics and our unchanging dependence on the sea for goods and trade, the value of naval forces would seem self-evident. However, naval forces seem to be marginalized, both from a theoretical perspective and in terms of practical application. Theoretically, naval and maritime aspects of international relations and security studies are relatively scarce (Bueger and Edmunds 2017, 1293). As Bueger and Edmunds point out, even with the broadening of the field of security studies in the mid to late 1990s, maritime security and the naval domain has not been a focus for analysis within International Relations theory in general or security studies in particular (Bueger and Edmunds 2017). Moreover, the independence of the concept of sea power as something separate from land and airpower is questioned (Bull 1976, 1), as is the need for a distinctive naval strategic and tactical tradition (Till 2009, 43–45). This challenge to naval strategic theory is not new and the lack of a naval perspective when analysing military conflict was already addressed by Mahan who states: “An accurate judgment upon this point cannot be formed by mastering only such facts of the particular contest as have been clearly transmitted, for as usual the naval transactions have been slightingly passed over … […] … ” (Mahan 2015, 14–15). Similarly Corbett, when discussing the Russian-Japanese war, remarks on the obscurity of naval warfare theory: “ … […] … the Far Eastern struggle is seen to develop on the same lines as all our great maritime wars of the past, which continental strategists have so persistently excluded from their field of study” (Corbett 2004, 79). The above examples are concerned with the questioning or underutilisation of naval theory in the study of military campaigns, yet questions have also been raised related to the underutilisation of naval forces in practice. In analysing the Tamil insurgency ...
Language: en
LA - en SN - 1470-2436 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2021.1931133 ID - ref1 ER -