TY - JOUR PY - 2023// TI - On why we lack confidence in some signal-detection-based analyses of confidence JO - Consciousness and cognition A1 - Arnold, Derek H. A1 - Johnston, Alan A1 - Adie, Joshua A1 - Yarrow, Kielan SP - e103532 EP - e103532 VL - 113 IS - N2 - Signal-detection theory (SDT) is one of the most popular frameworks for analyzing data from studies of human behavior - including investigations of confidence. SDT-based analyses of confidence deliver both standard estimates of sensitivity (d'), and a second estimate informed by high-confidence decisions - meta d'. The extent to which meta d' estimates fall short of d' estimates is regarded as a measure of metacognitive inefficiency, quantifying the contamination of confidence by additional noise. These analyses rely on a key but questionable assumption - that repeated exposures to an input will evoke a normally-shaped distribution of perceptual experiences (the normality assumption). Here we show, via analyses inspired by an experiment and modelling, that when distributions of experience do not conform with the normality assumption, meta d' can be systematically underestimated relative to d'. Our data highlight that SDT-based analyses of confidence do not provide a ground truth measure of human metacognitive inefficiency. We explain why deviance from the normality assumption is especially a problem for some popular SDT-based analyses of confidence, in contrast to other analyses inspired by the SDT framework, which are more robust to violations of the normality assumption.
Language: en
LA - en SN - 1053-8100 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2023.103532 ID - ref1 ER -