TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2012//
TI  - Why suicide-terrorists get educated, and what to do about it
JO  - Public choice
A1  - Azam, J.-p.
SP  - 357
EP  - 373
VL  - 153
IS  - 3-4
N2  - This paper tries to reconcile the observed fact that suicide-terrorists have a relatively high education level with rationality. It brings out the conditions under which potential students choose to acquire some education in a rational-choice model where this yields a non-zero probability of blowing up the resulting human capital in a terrorist attack. The comparative-statics of the rational expectations equilibrium of this model demonstrate how economic development, on the one hand, and repression, on the other hand, might reduce terrorism under some parameter restrictions. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>
LA  - en
SN  - 0048-5829
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9798-7
ID  - ref1
ER  -