Citation

Boehmer CR, Sobek D. J. Peace Res. 2005; 42(1): 5-26.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2005, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/0022343305049664

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This article examines how economic development influences interstate conflict. Rather than theorizing a linear relationship between economic development and state behavior in militarized conflicts, this article hypothesizes a non-linear relationship where both extreme poverty and prosperity reduce this risk. This occurs because states at an intermediate level of development have both the opportunity and willingness to pursue territorial claims, which makes them most prone to militarized interstate conflicts. The changing orientation of economies from agricultural and extractive activities eventually to service-based economies alters the cost-benefit calculations concerning territorial acquisition. Developed states, more reliant on services for their economic growth, are less likely to push territorial claims, decreasing their involvement in interstate conflict. Meanwhile, the poorest states, although they have more to gain through territorial expansion, have a decreased ability to pursue their objectives through military force. The authors examine all states between 1870 and 1992 at the monadic level of analysis. In general, the statistical analysis confirms the hypotheses. States at an intermediate level of development are most prone to initiate and participate in militarized conflicts, including those over the issue of territory and those that result in battlefield deaths. High levels of economic development mitigate the effects of military power and population growth that increase the risk of interstate violence. This project helps explain why past studies have linked development to both war and peace, as well as suggesting possible flashpoints in the future. Finally, the results also suggest that other models in the literature theorizing linear functions for economic development and conflict are misspecified.