Citation

Airaksinen T. J. Peace Res. 1988; 25(3): 213-227.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1988, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/002234338802500302

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Threats and coercion occur in conflict situations. Sometimes mere force and violence are applied. But people also make offers in order to exercise their power. Coercion is characterized as such rational social interaction and exercise of power that the weaker party is threatened by the stronger party. The weaker party will suffer a loss whatever it does, and the stronger party will gain from such action Two different interpretations of coercion are possible: descriptive and normative. In many cases, both interpretations apply to a given case, as Robert Nozick has shown The problem is that this creates a harmful ambiguity in the sense that one and the same case may involve both an offer and a threat. This is impossible. The weaker party is either threatened or is presented with an offer. It is actually very difficult to distinguish analytically between threats and offers, although morally the difference is all important. This paper presents a theory of how such a distinction can be made and analyzes a number of detailed examples as test cases. It is argued that the victim of coercion has a choice between two disequilibrium situations. Offers are different in this respect. Coercion is compared with exploitation. Some coercion is morally justifiable. This feature is also difficult to understand because coercion is always a prima facie evil strategy. The final result is that in many cases a concept like coercion cannot be applied in any value-free manner. This suggestion has deep methodological consequences for social science. Some social science concepts have value elements in their deep structure.