Citation

Diehl PF. J. Peace Res. 1985; 22(3): 249-259.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1985, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/002234338502200306

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This study investigates whether arms races and unilateral military buildups enhance or dominish the chances for compromise, capitulation, or stalemate in militarized confrontations that end short of war. Correlates of War Project data are used to identify militarized confrontations and construct an index of military buildup intensity. Unilateral military buildups were found to be unrelated to any of the kinds of 'no war' outcomes. Arms races were strongly related to capitulation outcomes, while having a negative affinity with stalemate outcomes. Controls for different coding decisions and national capabilities did not alter the results reported. Arms races may increase the importance of bargaining resolve in a crisis, but they did not appear to be a contributing factor to that resolve.