Citation

Van Wingen J, Tillema HK. J. Peace Res. 1980; 17(4): 291-303.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1980, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/002234338001700402

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The United Kingdom practiced foreign military intervention more than thirty times in more than twenty countries after World War II. She used force more extensively than any other major country despite her reduced status in the post-war era. The question is whether Britain's extensive military activity can be explained in the same terms as those often used to account for the militance of some great powers. Where, when, and why Britain initiated thirty-four military interventions between 1949 and 1970 are examined. It is found that most interventions were limited to countries within the bounds of the post-war Empire in the immediate vicinity of an Army base, experiencing political violence, whose authorities might officially request British action. These limits constrained where and when England appealed to arms more rigidly after World War II than before, and more rigidly than is usually expected among great powers. In addition, some functions often attributed to imperial or great power military intervention are evaluated. It is found that the United Kingdom did not systematically use military force on behalf of her greatest trade monopolies, her most profitable overseas invest ments, nor very much on behalf of the greatest concentrations of her citizens. If the hallmark of a great power is the flexible application of military power to further obvious national interests, Britain did not behave as a great power. This challenges notions of a simple relationship between national capability and military practice. It also suggests difficulties in promoting international peace: international society permits more than one syndrome of extensive national military violence.