Citation

Salmon JD. J. Peace Res. 1988; 25(1): 69-80.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1988, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/002234338802500107

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Increasing levels of destructiveness inherent in nuclear weapons or even 'improved' conventional weaponry are perceived as potential threats to the defender's own society, and of doubtful moral acceptability. One approach to defense at lower levels of destruction involves limitations upon the use of conventional weapons. A second approach would abandon armed defense entirely and rely upon some form of non-violent defense. The latter method however suffers from certain limitations and in any case could not be implemented immediately, which requires that during a transition phase some form of defense combining military and non-violent means must exist. Combining military and non violent defense offers flexibility and, in some cases, potential for improved defense. Because mixed violent and non-violent defense is a variety of 'bounded war', separation of the two methods by geographic zones, timing, and organizational structure is helpful, perhaps essential, to obtaining the 'cooperation' of the aggressor in maintaining the limits. Some problems of creating and maintaining separation and limitation are discussed, and brief illustrations are provided. The study concludes that although conceptual models are relatively clear and little changed in the past decade, combined violent/ non-violent defense belongs to the large class of security theories that are not susceptible of proof short of experience, if then, and require advocates or governments to act on combined logic and faith.