Citation

Byrne S. J. Peace Res. 2001; 38(3): 327-352.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2001, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/0022343301038003004

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

A number of consociational power-sharing initiatives are compared to explore some of the reasons why the elite conflict regulation model has not settled the Northern Ireland conflict. In the period 1972-85, four attempts by the British government to formulate and implement a power-sharing government within Northern Ireland failed as a result of the recalcitrance of one or other of the mainstream political parties. The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) ended the Unionist veto and included the Irish government in the political process to find a solution. Since 1985, four efforts by both governments to establish a devolved power-sharing government have included previously marginalized political groups in the political process. In this article, I argue that since the 1985 AIA the bilateral external ethnoguarantors - the British and Irish governments - have contained the conflict by using a coercive consociational approach to elite conflict management. Since 1985, four efforts to promote contact between Unionists and Nationalists at all levels and all points show promise in reframing the conflict from resources and interests to identity needs. Such a transformational approach is necessary to open up thinking about conflict and in constructing a multimodal, multilevel contingency approach to peace-building and conflict settlement in Northern Ireland.