Citation

Bellany I. J. Peace Res. 1996; 33(3): 263-271.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1996, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/0022343396033003002

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

A cybernetic approach is taken to the operation of the security dilemma under conditions favourable to its resolution when states have defensive intentions and access only to defensive weaponry. A systems model of this situation indicates that when only two parties are involved, the security dilemma is resolvable - the system attains a stable peacetime equilibrium - even when some of the above constraints are relaxed. But when more than two parties are involved, the preconditions for a stable equilibrium and resolution of the security dilemma become very much more demanding. The enquiry throws light on a diversity of contemporary issues, including the emerging multipolar international order, nuclear non-proliferation and non-offensive defence.