Citation

Afheldt H. J. Peace Res. 1973; 10(3): 259-263.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1973, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/002234337301000310

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Seven theses and two consequences constitute the summary of the study: Thesis 1: The Federal Republic of Germany can not be defended by means of conven tional weapons. Thesis 2: The use of nuclear weapons in defence of West Germany would lead to nuclear self-destruction. Thesis 3: For the Federal Republic of Germany there only exists a self-contradictory pol icy of deterrence (deterrence by means of incalculable risks for both sides). Thesis 4: Between the superpowers there exists a strategy of deterrence which in its mili tary logic is not self-contradictory. Thesis 5: Deterrence policy as pursued by the superpowers (however) results in an arms race. Thesis 6: The arms race increases the risk of war. Thesis 7: The attempt to maintain an equilibrium of deterrence through the arms race cripples the superpowers politically and militarily. Consequences: 1. Precisely because it is highly questionable, the deterrence system opens up a margin of man oeuvre for the Federal Republic of Germany to utilize armaments decisions as a means for foreign policy. 2. In the appraisal of any policy, top priority must be given to contributions to the creation of a politically guaranteed world peace.