Citation

Greffenius S, Gill J. J. Peace Res. 1992; 29(1): 39-52.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1992, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/0022343392029001004

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

In the crisis preceding the Gulf war, the United States favored pure coercion over carrot-and-stick offers. This article, which replicates and extends research reported by Leng (1984), supports the hypothesis that carrot-and-stick offers work better than pure coercion if an actor has already demonstrated resolve. Beginning with Jervis's (1976) distinction between deterrence and spiral theories of interaction, the article assesses the effects of various types of forceful moves in crisis bargaining. Interrupted time-series techniques are used with data on hostility levels in two confrontations to test the hypothesis that pure coercion tends to elicit a response in kind, whereas carrot-and-stick offers tend to elicit accommodation. Analysis of Behavioral Correlates of War data on actors' responses in the Cuban missile crisis and in the Egyptian-Israeli confrontation in 1967 corroborate Leng's original findings. Iraq's responses to the USA's threats in the Gulf conflict suggest that pure coercion can induce an opponent to fight even when it is weaker.