Citation

Ter Borg M. J. Peace Res. 1992; 29(2): 145-160.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1992, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/0022343392029002003

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The theme of the article is the multilateral reduction of offensive capabilities, aimed at the enhancement of conventional defensive superiority as a means of war prevention. This approach surfaced at the 1932 World Disarmament Conference in Geneva. It was promoted in order to enhance confidence, prevent a disastrous arms race, and allow for a 'cooling-off' period in times of tension. Uppermost in most minds, however, was the aim of precluding the possibility of a 'lightning attack' by prohibiting the necessary hardware - bombers and tanks. The origin of the approach cannot be traced back much further than 1930, to the influential leader of the peace movement, Lord Cecil, and the strategic thinker Liddell Hart. After initial widespread support by political delegates, fruitless debates in special technical commissions led to stagnation, while Hitler rose to power. Advocates of the revival of the powers of the offensive, such as Fuller and Winston Churchill, had had no doubts about what kind of hardware to promote, in order to prevent a repetition of the stalemate of World War I. When it came to abolishing rather than promoting weapons, however, they refused to fully accept the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons. In order to save a handful of experimental tanks, and the dream they promised of a revival of decisive offensive warfare, the military experts of the major powers let pass the chance of preventing war through the reduction of offensive capabilities. The Conference failed, and Hitler set out to acquire exactly those bits of hardware that promised success through what was later to become known as the 'Blitzkrieg'. Thus, in 1932 the window of opportunity, still slightly ajar, finally closed, preparing the way for World War II. Today the approach has another chance, but once again the window of opportunity is closing.