Citation

Chatterjee P. J. Peace Res. 1972; 9(1): 51-61.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1972, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/002234337200900104

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The paper attempts to formulate an axiomatic model of the classical balance of power system using the fundamental notion that a stable bal ance of power implies the absence of a predomin nant actor or coalition. It is shown that the basic motivation for participating in such a system is security in a world where each nation fears the prospect of being on the losing side. Under condi tions of perfect information, such a system will only be stable when exact equality of power can be maintained, if necessary by suitable alignments with previously neutral nations. Under conditions of uncertainty, the desirable goal would be stable deterrence which may imply an attempt to gain power superior to one's opponent. In both situa tions, a stable equilibrium may be attained only under fairly restricted conditions. The most suc cessful operation would be similar to the 'holder of the balance' case. A 'multipolar' system is more likely to be stable.