Citation

Axelrod R. J. Peace Res. 1990; 27(3): 247-254.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1990, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/0022343390027003002

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

'Stability' is a widely used concept in strategic analysis, especially in the context of nuclear strategy. This article examines the meaning of the term, and shows how it can be usefully applied to problems of conventional war, especially as these problems apply to Europe. In scientific usage, stability is the condition in which a slight disturbance in a system does not produce too disturbing an effect on that system. Traditionally, military writings in both East and West have been more deeply concerned with balance than with stability. In Europe today there is a paradox of strategic stability: the danger of instability at high levels of conflict promotes stability at low levels. Nevertheless, there are many political problems in Europe that are potential causes of instability and that should not be ignored. Attending to the problems of strategic stability also means a concern with linkages between conventional and nuclear war, vulnerabilities of armies to surprise attacks, maintenance of command and control, the relative strength of the defense compared to the offense, and the subtle interacting effects of dispersal, alert, and mobilization.