Citation

Agassi J. J. Physiol. (Paris) 2007; 101(4-6): 153-160.

Affiliation

Department of Philosophy, Tel-Aviv University, Faculty of Arts, Ramat Aviv, Tel-Aviv 69967, Israel. agass@post.tau.ac.il

Copyright

(Copyright © 2007, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.jphysparis.2007.11.010

PMID

18261888

Abstract

The body-mind problem invites scientific study, since mental events are repeated and repeatable and invite testable explanations. They seemed troublesome because of the classical theory of substance that failed to solve its own central problems. These are soluble with the aid of the theory of the laws of nature, particularly in its emergentist version [Bunge, M., 1980. The Body-mind Problem, Pergamon, Oxford] that invites refutable explanations [Popper, K.R., 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson, London]. The view of mental properties as emergent is a modification of the two chief classical views, materialism and dualism. As this view invites testable explanations of events of the inner world, it is better than the quasi-behaviorist view of self-awareness as computer-style self-monitoring [Minsky, M., Laske, O., 1992. A conversation with Marvin Minsky. AI Magazine 13 (3), 31-45].

Language: en