Citation

Spigelman J. Int. Compar. Law Q. 2010; 59(03): 543-570.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2010, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Publisher Cambridge University Press)

DOI

10.1017/S0020589310000229

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Freedom from fear, expressly recognized in the foundational human rights treaties, has been forgotten in human rights discourse. Fear can have profound behavioural impacts. Without recognition of the importance of freedom from fear, the fulfilment of many human rights is compromised, particularly physical security. Politico-legal thought, from Montesquieu and Blackstone, has long identified the significance of security of the person and the tension between liberty and security. Comparative exploration of contemporary case law reveals disparate approaches to the recognition of security of the person as an individual right which the State is obliged to protect. Increasing the salience of security of the person and the dimension of freedom from fear in human rights decision making raises the difficult issue of balancing conflicting rights.