Citation

Watson A, Hall L, Raber E, Hauschild VD, Dolislager F, Love AH, Hanna ML. Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. 2011; 17(1): 2-56.

Affiliation

Toxicology and Hazard Assessment, Environmental Sciences Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN, USA.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2011, Amherst Scientific Publishers)

DOI

10.1080/10807039.2010.534721

PMID

21390292

PMCID

PMC3046625

Abstract

In the event of a chemical terrorist attack on a transportation hub, post-event remediation and restoration activities necessary to attain unrestricted facility reuse and re-entry could require hours to multiple days. While restoration timeframes are dependent on numerous variables, a primary controlling factor is the level of pre-planning and decision-making completed prior to chemical terrorist release. What follows is the first of a two-part analysis identifying key considerations, critical information, and decision criteria to facilitate post-attack and post-decontamination consequence management activities. A conceptual site model and human health-based exposure guidelines are developed and reported as an aid to site-specific pre-planning in the current absence of U.S. state or Federal values designated as compound-specific remediation or re-entry concentrations, and to safely expedite facility recovery to full operational status. Chemicals of concern include chemical warfare nerve and vesicant agents and the toxic industrial compounds phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, and cyanogen chloride. This work has been performed as a national case study conducted in partnership with the Los Angeles International Airport and The Bradley International Terminal. All recommended guidelines have been selected for consistency with airport scenario release parameters of a one-time, short-duration, finite airborne release from a single source followed by compound-specific decontamination.

Language: en