Citation

Morris JC, Morris ED, Jones DM. Public Adm. Rev. 2007; 67: 94-106.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2007, American Society for Public Administration, Publisher John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/j.1540-6210.2007.00818.x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

When Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Mississippi Gulf Coast in August 2005, it immediately overwhelmed the abilities of local and state emergency management officials to respond to the ensuing disaster. Although the U.S. Coast Guard and some military units were on scene shortly after the passage of the storm, there seemed to be interminable delays before the military forces began to arrive in numbers to both provide humanitarian relief and secure the affected areas. This article analyzes the response of the National Guard, active-duty military, and Coast Guard forces through the lens of coordination. We find evidence of the successful use of both traditional hierarchical and network-based coordination; we also find support for Donald Kettl’s idea of “contingent coordination.”