Citation

Sánchez‐Pagés S. J. Public Econ. Theory 2007; 9(5): 809-830.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2007, John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00333.x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This paper analyzes a model where groups can attain exclusive ownership of a resource by means of a contest. We show that more concave production technologies and more egalitarianism within groups induce higher levels of social conflict. We then study endogenous coalition formation. Under cooperative exploitation of the resource, the grand coalition is the efficient partition but there exists a strong tendency toward bipartisan conflicts. Under noncooperative exploitation, conflict can ex ante Pareto dominate peaceful access and it becomes more difficult to support the grand coalition as a stable structure.