Citation

Roca CP, Helbing D. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 2011; 108(28): 11370-11374.

Affiliation

Chair of Sociology, Modeling and Simulation, ETH Zurich, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland and Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2011, National Academy of Sciences)

DOI

10.1073/pnas.1101044108

PMID

21709245

PMCID

PMC3136269

Abstract

Human wellbeing in modern societies relies on social cohesion, which can be characterized by high levels of cooperation and a large number of social ties. Both features, however, are frequently challenged by individual self-interest. In fact, the stability of social and economic systems can suddenly break down as the recent financial crisis and outbreaks of civil wars illustrate. To understand the conditions for the emergence and robustness of social cohesion, we simulate the creation of public goods among mobile agents, assuming that behavioral changes are determined by individual satisfaction. Specifically, we study a generalized win-stay-lose-shift learning model, which is only based on previous experience and rules out greenbeard effects that would allow individuals to guess future gains. The most noteworthy aspect of this model is that it promotes cooperation in social dilemma situations despite very low information requirements and without assuming imitation, a shadow of the future, reputation effects, signaling, or punishment. We find that moderate greediness favors social cohesionby a coevolution between cooperation and spatial organization, additionally showing that those cooperation-enforcing levels of greediness can be evolutionarily selected. However, a maladaptive trend of increasing greediness, although enhancing individuals' returns in the beginning, eventually causes cooperation and social relationships to fall apart. Our model is, therefore, expected to shed light on the long-standing problem of the emergence and stability of cooperative behavior.

Language: en