Citation

Sherman GD, Haidt J. Emot. Rev. 2011; 3(3): 245-251.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2011, International Society for Research on Emotion, Publisher SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/1754073911402396

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Moral emotions are evolved mechanisms that function in part to optimize social relationships. We discuss two moral emotions-- disgust and the "cuteness response"--which modulate social-engagement motives in opposite directions, changing the degree to which the eliciting entity is imbued with mental states (i.e., mentalized). Disgust-inducing entities are hypo-mentalized (i.e., dehumanized); cute entities are hyper-mentalized (i.e., "humanized"). This view of cuteness--which challenges the prevailing view that cuteness is a releaser of parental instincts (Lorenz, 1950/1971)--explains (a) the broad range of affiliative behaviors elicited by cuteness, (b) the marketing of cuteness to children (by toy makers and animators) to elicit play, and (c) the apparent ease and frequency with which cute things are anthropomorphized.