Citation

Jee J, Sundstrom A, Massey SE, Mishra B. J. R. Soc. Interface 2013; 10(88): 20130614.

Affiliation

Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, New York University, , New York, NY 10003, USA.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2013, Royal Society)

DOI

10.1098/rsif.2013.0614

PMID

23985735

Abstract

This paper describes a novel application of information-asymmetric (signalling) games to molecular biology in which utility is determined by the message complexity (rate) in addition to the error in information transfer (distortion). We show using a computational model how it is possible for the agents in one such game to evolve a signalling convention (separating equilibrium) that is suboptimal in terms of information transfer, but is nonetheless stable. In the context of an RNA world merging with a nascent amino acid one, such a game's equilibrium is alluded to by the genetic code, which is nearly optimal in terms of information transfer, but is also near-universal and nearly immutable. Such a framework suggests that cellularity may have emerged to encourage coordination between RNA species and sheds light on other aspects of RNA world biochemistry yet to be fully understood.

Language: en