Citation

Ayazbekov A. Nonprolif. Rev. 2014; 21(2): 149-168.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2014, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/10736700.2014.962248

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This article examines Kazakhstani nuclear decision making from December 1991 to May 1992. The study is based on unique archival data and reveals how Kazakhstan's policy makers solved a nuclear dilemma that the nation faced in its first years of independence. The article reconstructs the internal policy-making process behind the decision made by President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his circle of advisors to accept non-nuclear status. The author argues that Almaty elaborated a deliberately ambivalent strategy toward the republic's nuclear status with the aim of maximizing the state's strategic interests. The article reviews external pressures affecting Nazarbayev's course of action and discusses policy options articulated during this period.