Citation

Edwards B, Furnas A, Forrest S, Axelrod R. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 2017; 114(11): 2825-2830.

Affiliation

Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 benjamin.edwards@ibm.com axe@umich.edu.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2017, National Academy of Sciences)

DOI

10.1073/pnas.1700442114

PMID

28242700

Abstract

Cyber conflict is now a common and potentially dangerous occurrence. The target typically faces a strategic choice based on its ability to attribute the attack to a specific perpetrator and whether it has a viable punishment at its disposal. We present a game-theoretic model, in which the best strategic choice for the victim depends on the vulnerability of the attacker, the knowledge level of the victim, payoffs for different outcomes, and the beliefs of each player about their opponent. The resulting blame game allows analysis of four policy-relevant questions: the conditions under which peace (i.e., no attacks) is stable, when attacks should be tolerated, the consequences of asymmetric technical attribution capabilities, and when a mischievous third party or an accident can undermine peace. Numerous historical examples illustrate how the theory applies to cases of cyber or kinetic conflict involving the United States, Russia, China, Japan, North Korea, Estonia, Israel, Iran, and Syria.

Language: en

Keywords

Bayesian game theory; attribution; blame; cyber conflict; strategy