Citation

Heffington C. J. Glob. Secur. Stud. 2017; 2(2): 123-136.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2017, International Studies Association, Publisher Oxford University Press)

DOI

10.1093/jogss/ogx003

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

How do sanctions affect the dynamics of political violence in target states? More specifically, how might sanctions affect domestic terrorism in these states? The literature on the consequences of sanctions in target states is rich, yet there has been limited research on how sanctions affect terrorism in target states. In this article, I argue that economic deprivation associated with costly sanctions makes recruiting and carrying out attacks easier for domestic terrorist organizations. Building on work that examines the consequences of sanctions and the economic roots of terrorism, I suggest that sanctions impose economic hardship on regular citizens, who are then more likely to turn to anti-government violence. The result is that the pool from which terrorist groups recruit is broadened during sanctions. I test this argument quantitatively and find support for the hypothesis that costly sanctions lead to higher levels of domestic terrorism.

Language: en