Citation

Drayton LA, Santos LR, Baskin-Sommers A. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 2018; 115(13): 3302-3307.

Affiliation

Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520 arielle.baskin-sommers@yale.edu.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2018, National Academy of Sciences)

DOI

10.1073/pnas.1721903115

PMID

29531085

Abstract

Psychopathic individuals display a chronic and flagrant disregard for the welfare of others through their callous and manipulative behavior. Historically, this behavior is thought to result from deficits in social-affective processing. However, we show that at least some psychopathic behaviors may be rooted in a cognitive deficit, specifically an inability to automatically take another person's perspective. Unlike prior studies that rely solely on controlled theory of mind (ToM) tasks, we employ a task that taps into automatic ToM processing. Controlled ToM processes are engaged when an individual intentionally considers the perspective of another person, whereas automatic ToM processes are engaged when an individual unintentionally represents the perspective of another person. In a sample of incarcerated offenders, we find that psychopathic individuals are equally likely to show response interference under conditions of controlled ToM, but lack a common signature of automatic ToM known as altercentric interference. We also demonstrate that the magnitude of this dysfunction in altercentric interference is correlated with real-world callous behaviors (i.e., number of assault charges). These findings suggest that psychopathic individuals have a diminished propensity to automatically think from another's perspective, which may be the cognitive root of their deficits in social functioning and moral behavior.

Language: en

Keywords

altercentric interference; automatic theory of mind; controlled theory of mind; psychopathy; theory of mind