Citation

Reeves C. Soc. Leg. Stud. 2019; 28(1): 31-57.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2019, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/0964663918764794

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

In this article, I consider the question of what punishment expresses and propose a way of approaching the question that overcomes problems in both psychosocial and philosophical expressivist traditions. The problem in both traditions is, I suggest, the need for an adequate moral - neither moralizing nor reductive - psychology, and I argue that Melanie Klein's work offers such a moral psychology. I offer a reconstruction of Klein's central claims and begin to sketch some of its potential implications for an expressive account of punishment. I outline a Kleinian interpretation of modern punishment's expression as of an essentially persecutory nature but also include depressive realizations that have generally proved too difficult for liberal modernity to work through successfully, and the recent 'persecutory turn' is a defence against such realizations. I conclude by considering the wider philosophical significance of a Kleinian account for the expressivist theory of punishment.

Language: en