Citation

Wenner M. Polit. Geogr. 2020; 77: e102094.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2020, Butterworth-Heinemann)

DOI

10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102094

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between de facto sovereign violence and order in spaces of contested authority. Here, so-called "informal sovereigns" imbued with the power to kill and punish with impunity can act either as rebels against, or as chosen mediators for, a weak government. This paper takes this ambivalent relationship between informal sovereigns and the state as a starting point to explore the different functions of sovereign violence drawing on a case study from Darjeeling, India. Here, informal sovereigns appear in the form of regional leaders of an autonomy movement that has, at times, violently challenged the government's authority over the region. Drawing on Walter Benjamin's distinction between law-making and law-preserving violence, the paper argues that sovereign violence performed by such informal sovereigns has different functions. It can either stabilize or challenge existing power relations and legal orders. To differentiate these functions and to account for the ambivalent relations between informal sovereigns and the state, the category of informal sovereigns needs to be disentangled. To do so, this paper establishes a distinction between 'petty sovereigns', whose sovereignty is outsourced from the state, and 'autonomous sovereigns', whose authority is mainly grounded in actors' capacity to perform excessive violent acts. While petty sovereigns' violence is law-preserving and strengthens existing power relations, autonomous sovereigns engage in law-making activities and aspire to affect changed orders and to benefit from that change. The case study concludes that a sovereign's efficacy in effecting order is not only grounded in violence. Rather, its authority emerges from the grey zone of the negotiated boundaries between itself and the state, and its recognition by its respective constituents.

Language: en