Citation

Hagen K. Soc. Epistomiol. 2020; 34(5): 423-439.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2020, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/02691728.2020.1747118

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This article addresses the question, 'Should scholars debunk conspiracy theories or stay neutral?' It describes 'conspiracy theories' and two senses of 'neutrality,' arguing that scholars should be neutral in the sense of being fair and openminded. While that does not exclude the possibility of debunking, it does mean that the motive should be to assess rather than to debunk. This article also responds to a particular group of social scientists who have argued that conspiracy theories are 'unhealthy,' and suggests that their perspective may be reasonably representative of social scientists working on conspiracy theories. Maintaining that the arguments given for pathologizing conspiracy theorists are poor ones, it suggests that social scientists have not shown a tendency to treat conspiracy theories reasonably or fairly, and further suggests that they are therefore unlikely to be helpful in assessing conspiracy theories unless they reform their attitude. Greater appreciation for the philosophical literature on this issue may help social scientists come to appreciate that conspiracy theories ought to be evaluated on their particular merits, not pathologized and dismissed as generally unhealthy.

Language: en

Keywords

Conspiracy theories; debunking; neutrality; pathologizing; philosophy; social sciences